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ABSTRACT 
New technology firms such as Uber and Airbnb have recently spurred the advent of the 
sharing economy (SE). Faced with institutionally diverse environments, SE firms apply 
various market and non-market strategies through which they actively legitimize their 
products/services. In-depth qualitative analyses of several regulative, normative, and 
cognitive institutions in the Netherlands, the UK, and Egypt reveal that similar institutional 
strategies have different effects in different country contexts. In countries with lower degrees 
of institutionalization, SE firms can address grand societal challenges and leverage the power 
they gain to shape government regulations and public perception to their advantage. In 
countries with higher degrees of institutionalization, firms with disruptive and transformative 
strategies (e.g., Uber) can provide rapid but short-term gains, whereas firms with more 
relational and additive strategies (e.g., Airbnb) may allow for more sustainable legitimacy 
gains. Furthermore, the extent to which acting locally and addressing the needs of the 
community leads to legitimation largely depends on whether the national government leaves 
the regulation of a new service or product to local authorities or takes an active role in 
establishing standards nation-wide. These findings pave the way for a future contingency 
theory of country institutional environments and firm institutional strategies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Keep Chicago Uber. Join us in advocating for more economic opportunity, choice and 
competition - sign the petition today! Ask the Chicago City Council to reject Alderman 
Anthony Beale’s anti-consumer plan.”—Email sent to Uber customers in Chicago by Uber 
CEO, Travis Kalanick (2016) 
This was one of the many emails sent to Uber customers around the world in 2016 to put 
pressure on local lawmakers to allow Uber to operate. Similarly, consider the 6.2 magnitude 
earthquake on August 23, 2016, which completely destroyed several small villages in central 
Italy. Shortly after, Airbnb activated its disaster response program that waived all service fees 
for hundreds of hosts in the region, making it easy to offer free shelter to disaster victims. 
Such community-building initiatives helped Airbnb further legitimize and solidify its place in 
the hospitality sector. Similarly, a woman in Egypt who rated an Uber driver poorly upon 
experiencing sexual harassment
1
 in the vehicle was contacted 30 minutes after the incident by 
Uber Egypt’s head of operations, who apologized, explained the procedure Uber had taken 
with the driver, refunded her trip, and gave her extra ride credits. Within 72 hours, this was 
the most shared story on Egyptian social media, and Uber rides skyrocketed. While these 
strategies were effective in helping the focal firm legitimize their service and grow in these 
particular countries, it is unclear whether they would work equally well in other country 
settings. This paper focuses on the contingent effects of country-specific institutional 
environments on firms’ institutional strategies2 through the following research question: How 
do firm strategies to gain legitimacy by shaping the institutional environment have different 
effects in different country contexts?
3
 
While a large body of literature has analyzed the multifaceted influence of 
institutions—humanly devised constraints (regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive) that 
                                                 
1
 According to the United Nations, 99.3 percent of women in Egypt have experienced some form of sexual 
harassment; with 81 percent reporting frequent harassment while using public transportation. 
2
 We define institutional strategies as all market and non-market activities to increase a firm’s competitive 
advantage (also see Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Dorobantu et al., 2017). 
3
 We define legitimacy as “perceived consonance with relevant institutions and alignment with cultural-cognitive 
frameworks” (Scott, 2008: 60). 
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structure political, economic, and social interaction (North, 1991:97; Scott, 2008:56)—on 
organizations (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Peng, Wang, & 
Jiang, 2008), less attention has been paid to exploring how organizations purposefully and 
strategically shape their institutional environment to improve their competitive advantage 
(Marquis & Raynard, 2015). However, as the recent research has shown, the effective 
management of regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions—such as, government 
regulations and public perceptions—is no less important to organizational performance than 
business success in the marketplace (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; 
Marquis & Qian, 2014; Seelos & Mair, 2007). In this paper, we document a variety of 
institutional strategies used by firms to legitimize their products and/or services by 
influencing the regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions in specific countries (Hillman 
& Hitt, 1999; Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Dorobantu, Kaul, & Zelner, 2017). 
The existing literature has shown that firms attempt to influence the perceptions of key 
stakeholder groups as part of their legitimacy-seeking in a variety of settings (e.g., in newly 
emerging industries, Aldrich & Fiol 1994; Suchman 1995, during institutional change, 
Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009, and in institutional 
voids, Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). However, our 
understanding of the diversity and contextual dependence of the different institutional 
strategies used by firms remains incomplete. In particular, cross-country differences remain 
largely unexplored as most of the extant studies examine these strategies in one context. Of 
the few studies that examine institutional strategies across countries, Marquis and Raynard 
(2015) focus on institutional strategies in emerging markets where institutions are generally 
weak, while Dorobantu et al. (2017) focus on situations in which specific institutions are 
weak in a given country. While these studies provide invaluable insights, they keep the 
institutional contexts constant while varying firm strategies, strategic intents, or governance 
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modes. The effects of similar institutional strategies across different country contexts are 
unclear. Thus, there is still a gap with regard to the contingent effects of the general level of 
institutionalization in a country on the choice and effectiveness of a firm’s strategy to shape 
the specific institutions that govern a new innovation/technology. 
Studying this gap within the context of the sharing economy (SE)
4
 is particularly 
relevant as SE firms enter and attempt to legitimize themselves in highly diverse institutional 
environments that range from those with significant voids (e.g., Egypt) to highly 
institutionalized environments (e.g., the UK or the Netherlands). The SE also illustrates a 
special case because, on the one hand, SE firms offer solutions to societal problems with 
consequences for the welfare
5
 of society at large, such as generating trust and aiding 
community revival (Schor, 2016), or reducing waste and increasing the efficient use of 
resources (Hamari et al., 2015). On the other hand, the lack of a clear understanding of SE 
firms’ institutional strategies makes it difficult to untangle the conditions under which they 
truly benefit society from the conditions under which they exploit loopholes to avoid 
regulation. Thus far, the growing literature on SE has mainly focused on describing the 
phenomenon itself (Martin, 2016; Frenken, 2017) and its disrupting effect in a particular 
sector, e.g., transportation (Chan & Shaheen, 2012; Greenwood & Wattal, 2017) or in a 
particular geographic location, e.g., The United States (Hall & Krueger, 2015). A systematic 
comparison of how varying levels of institutionalization influence the type and effectiveness 
of the institutional strategies employed by SE firms remains unexplored. For instance, unique 
                                                 
4
 The SE can be defined as a class of economic arrangements that commonly uses information technologies to 
connect different stakeholders—individuals, companies, governments, and others—to make value by sharing 
their excess capacities for products and services (Belk, 2014; Wosskow, 2014; Hamari, Sjöklint, & Ukkonen, 
2015). 
5
 From a competition law perspective, welfare mostly concerns allocative efficiency, i.e., low prices and similar 
quantifiable aspects of surplus. From a consumer law perspective, welfare concerns the consumers’ position in 
market transactions, such as the balance between the consumer and the supplier, but also more qualitative 
aspects such as safety or health. We adopt a broad deﬁnition of public welfare—one that includes the well-being, 
protection, and prosperity of all the citizens in a society. 
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socio-economic characteristics (trust, safety, digital literacy, awareness of SE) and 
infrastructural conditions (commercial, technological, physical, financial, regulatory) in a 
country would severely affect how SE firms legitimize their products and/or services in the 
eyes of key stakeholders. 
Given the limited theory and empirical evidence on our research question of how 
firms’ institutional strategies have different effects in different country contexts, we conducted 
a comparative case study of two canonical global SE firms, Airbnb and Uber, in different 
geographic locations with rich social and institutional diversity, namely, the Netherlands, the 
UK, and Egypt. Through this study design, we draw connections among a) the two largest 
sectors, i.e., transportation and accommodation, which have been affected by the emergence 
of SE, and b) different stakeholders, e.g., firms, governments, and industry associations, that 
are engaged in the SE. As SE firms attempt to create and capture value by managing 
interactions across a multilateral set of market and non-market actors—e.g., consumers, 
owners of goods and/or services, investors, incumbents, governments, and municipalities 
(Ceccagnoli, Forman, Huang, & Wu, 2012)—we argue that it is important to consider this 
phenomenon in a holistic way, rather than studying the strategies of SE firms in isolation, in 
order to support a better understanding of the perspectives of key stakeholders and their 
interactions (Williamson & De Meyer, 2012; Belk, 2014; Uzunca, Sharapov & Tee, 2017). 
For this reason, we not only rely on Uber and Airbnb for information on their strategic actions 
and their views of the country-specific institutions, but also on interviews with government 
institutions, industry associations, and local SE firms to gain a more holistic view of the 
stakeholders on which these strategies had effects (Figure 1). 
----------------------Insert Figure 1 about here---------------------- 
Our findings provide a within- and across-country comparison of firms’ legitimacy-
seeking strategies. First, we compare Uber and Airbnb’s strategies in the same country—
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using Dorobantu et al. (2017)’s typology of non-market strategies—to show how SE firms 
use transformative versus additive approaches to legitimize their products and/or services in 
the same institutional context. In particular, we find that transformative strategies that break 
with existing institutions (e.g., employed by Uber) can provide rapid but short-term gains, 
whereas more relational and additive strategies that complement existing institutions (e.g., 
employed by Airbnb) allow for more sustainable legitimacy gains. However, we show that the 
success of these strategies is contingent on the degree of institutionalization of the country in 
question. In countries with a lower degree of institutionalization (e.g., Egypt), SE firms have 
more opportunities to transform their institutional environments by addressing grand societal 
challenges. However, in countries with higher degrees of institutionalization, relational and 
additive strategies provide longer-term legitimacy gains. Finally, we find that the approach of 
the national government also plays a contingent role. In particular, when the government takes 
a more proactive stance regarding the regulation of the new service or product, forming and/or 
participating in politically active industry associations and lobbying various higher 
institutional actors (e.g., ministers) can lead to additional opportunities to gain legitimacy and 
influence regulation. 
The discoveries presented in this article contribute to extant work on institutional 
(market and non-market) strategies as well as institutional entrepreneurship and voids. We 
take the view of legitimization as an endogenous process whereby different stakeholders’ 
perceptions about SE firms are formed as a result of the negotiations and interactions between 
key stakeholders, such as consumers, incumbent firms, and local and central governments. In 
this way, we draw attention to the coevolution of firm strategies and the institutional 
environment. In addition, our illustration of how SE firms can gain legitimacy in countries 
with lower degrees of institutionalization—by framing their products and/or services as 
complementary to extant institutions and leveraging technologies to address grand societal 
7 
 
 
challenges—expands the extant research on institutional voids and how entrepreneurial firms 
can use them to grow without facing strong resistance. We draw attention to the importance of 
countries as complex institutional environments in which firms’ institutional strategies 
materialize. Further, we highlight how firms must consider the benefits and costs for every 
stakeholder in these environments over time. In doing so, we motivate a future contingency 
theory of country institutional environments and firm institutional strategies.  
Finally, the setting of this study in the emerging field of the SE across three countries 
is a contribution to extant work in itself. The SE represents a radical shift in how business is 
organized and how value is created in a society with a higher diversity of interrelationships 
and opportunities for co-investment, co-learning and co-innovation (Belk, 2014; Moore, 2013; 
Williamson & De Meyer, 2012). Our findings provide a stepping stone for future studies to 
leverage the emergence of the SE across countries, stakeholders, and sectors as an opportunity 
to question traditional management theories and practices. 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, we provide a brief synopsis of the literature on ‘how organizations 
purposefully and strategically shape their institutional environment to improve their 
competitive advantage’ and identify inconsistencies, unarticulated assumptions, and gaps with 
regard to three related questions: 1) What are the market and non-market strategies that firms 
use to shape the institutions around them? 2) How do varying levels of institutionalization in 
different country contexts affect the choice and effectiveness of these strategies? 3) How does 
contestation by key stakeholders affect the successful implementation of these strategies? 
Firm Strategies to Shape the Institutional Environment 
To date, ﬁrms’ institutional strategies have been studied under non-market or corporate 
political strategies (Baron, 1995; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004), 
collective action (King & Pearce, 2010; Walker & Rea, 2014), and stakeholder management 
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(Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). The idea that actors in a new field (such as 
the SE) will strategically shape the existing institutions to gain legitimacy and/or competitive 
advantage dates back at least to Oliver’s (1991) seminal piece on strategic responses to 
institutional processes—through the choice-within-constraints tradition of the new 
institutionalism (Ingram & Clay, 2000; Ingram & Silverman, 2002). A common feature of this 
well-established and fertile field of inquiry in institutional theory is that it addresses how 
organizations strategically manage their broader external environments and, as such, it 
provides important insights for theorizing about SE firms’ legitimacy-seeking strategies. 
We integrate this work under the common heading of institutional strategies, which 
includes all market and non-market activities aimed at leveraging and influencing regulative, 
normative, and cognitive institutions to increase firms’ competitive advantage (Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999; Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Dorobantu et al., 2017). These strategies serve to 
legitimize the organization in the eyes of key stakeholders and to navigate institutionally 
diverse settings. For example, Hillman and Hitt (1999) examine three types of generic 
political strategies (information, financial incentive, and constituency building) and offer a 
number of tactics for each means of exchange in non-market settings (information, money, 
and votes, respectively). In a more recent effort, Marquis and Raynard (2015) identify three 
speciﬁc sets of institutional strategies; relational, infrastructure-building, and socio-cultural 
bridging. Relational strategies involve networking efforts to cultivate and manage dependency 
relationships with the government and key stakeholder groups (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Siegel, 
2007). Infrastructure-building strategies address missing or the inadequate regulatory, 
technological, and physical infrastructures that support business activities (Mair & Marti, 
2009; Rao, 1998; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). Socio-cultural bridging strategies tackle 
the socio-cultural and demographic issues that can hinder economic development and trade—
for example, political and social unrest, corruption, mistrust, unemployment, illiteracy, 
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poverty, and ethnic or religious conﬂicts. Finally, Dorobantu et al. (2017) argue that firms can 
follow either adaptive, additive, or transformative strategies towards the existing institutional 
environment, and they can do so either independently or in collaboration with others. While in 
the case of adaptive strategies, firms accept the institutional environment as given and do not 
attempt to change institutional costs neither for themselves or for other stakeholders; additive 
strategies keep the costs of other stakeholders unaffected after institutional change (win-no 
effect); and transformative strategies increase the costs of other stakeholders (win-lose). 
While these efforts have made progress in explaining the complexity of institutional 
strategies, our understanding of the diversity and contextual dependence of different 
institutional strategies remains far from complete. For instance, to what extent are the choice 
and effectiveness of institutional strategies context-specific? What aspects of the institutional 
environment and of the other stakeholders are relevant for the various institutional strategies? 
Further research is needed to understand the enabling conditions, activities, and abilities 
associated with the effective implementation of institutional change. 
Strategy Choice and Effectiveness under Different Degrees of Institutionalization 
Organizations act strategically when confronted with institutional constraints—those related 
to both variation across global contexts and the particularities of local contexts. Identifying 
the similarities and differences between these contexts is an important ﬁrst step to better 
understanding how organizations’ efforts to strategically manage or alter aspects of their 
institutional environment may have different effects in different country contexts.  
We begin by drawing on the degree of institutionalization, that is, the institution’s 
ability to adequately facilitate market transactions. Transacting in institutional environments 
where institutional voids have resulted in market inefficiencies, firms face more challenges 
due to relatively tumultuous and uncertain markets with greater opportunism by transaction 
partners (Williamson, 1975). However, such institutional environments also experience rapid 
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rates of industrialization, economic liberalization, and increased integration into the global 
economy. These frequent changes offer lower resistance to institutional change and give firms 
the opportunity to act as self-regulators (Cohen & Sundararajan, 2015) or public interest 
regulators (Farrell & Katz, 2000), in contexts where delegating some of government 
regulatory responsibility to firms allow for easier institutional transformation.  
Such strategies might not be feasible or needed in countries with higher degrees of 
institutionalization (Beckert, 1999). As Hillman and Hitt (1999) suggest, institutional 
differences between emerging and developed countries can lead to a variety of results in the 
institutional strategies that allows firms to successfully influence their regulative, normative, 
and cognitive institutions. Comparative studies are needed to systematically explore the 
influence of varying levels of institutionalization—i.e., institutions’ ability to facilitate market 
transactions as well as their resistance to change—on the type and effectiveness of firms’ 
institutional strategies. 
Stakeholder Reactions to Institutional Strategies 
The market entry of new types of firms can trigger opposition from industry incumbents 
whose resources they threaten or from regulators whose efforts in protecting the public 
welfare they risk (Aldrich & Baker, 2001; Pache & Santos, 2010; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). As 
Dorabantu et al. (2017) suggest, this pattern is more pronounced in transformative strategies, 
as opposed to additive ones, as the proposed institutional changes work to firms’ advantage at 
the cost of other stakeholders (win-lose). Market incumbents are known to attack such new 
entrants directly by introducing new products and services (Matzler, Veider, & Kathan, 2015) 
as well as indirectly by maintaining strong connections to key institutions that can impose 
restrictions on the new entrants (Aldrich & Baker, 2001; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). 
While diverse institutional conditions have largely been considered as exogenously 
given, the recent research suggests that the (re)actions of other key stakeholders can 
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endogenously generate threats / opportunities that firms, acting as institutional entrepreneurs, 
might avoid / exploit to instigate change (Battilana et al., 2009; Ozcan & Gurses, 2017). As a 
result, research seeking to assess the effect of institutional strategies on firm performance 
needs to consider the coevolution between the strategies of firms and the reactions of key 
stakeholders in the environment. For instance, what strategies are effective in the face of 
stronger opposition from fortified incumbents, particularly in sectors where various 
institutional actors (e.g., regulators, courts) protect incumbents through long-standing laws 
and regulations (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Russo, 2001)? While research shows that firms 
strategize to gain legitimacy (Hampel & Tracey, 2017), there is still a gap in our 
understanding of the enabling and/or preventive role of their interaction with other 
stakeholders on the effectiveness of their legitimacy-seeking.  
The SE offers an ideal setting to study the market entry and legitimization of new 
firms in different institutional contexts. SE firms’ interactions with various stakeholders (e.g., 
regulators, incumbents, consumers), as described in this study, hint at the existence of a 
coevolutionary relationship between these market entrants and key stakeholders in their 
environment. The development of the SE and regulators’ approaches also show large variance 
across countries, offering ample opportunities to explore the aforementioned gaps and provide 
new insights into how SE firms try to define the rules of a new game in a context in which 
everyone is used to playing by the rules (e.g., the UK, the Netherlands) versus in a context in 
which the rules are generally weak (e.g., Egypt). 
In addition to being an ideal setting for the theoretical contribution of our research 
topic, studying the SE itself is an important endeavor as this ‘new way of doing things’ can be 
critical for reaching a more efficient distribution, avoiding waste, and reducing unemployment 
in the face of an increasing world population (Wosskow, 2014). Understanding the growth 
and strategies of SE firms and their interaction with the environment can help policy makers 
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effectively categorize SE firms and determine the nature and limits of their activity while 
protecting the public welfare (as was recently seen in the specific case of Uber in London). 
Our comparative case study, described below, considers these different legitimacy routes 
taken by SE firms within different institutional environments. In the rest of the paper, we first 
present our approach to data collection and analysis, then we discuss our findings, and finally 
we summarize our discoveries and their contribution to the extant theory and practice. 
METHODS 
Given the limited theory on our research topic and the empirical work on the SE, we 
conducted an abductive study, which Suddaby (2006) describes as “the process by which a 
researcher moves between induction and deduction while practicing the constant comparative 
method” (Suddaby, 2006: 639). Abductive studies are especially suitable for identifying 
unusual empirical patterns that are not adequately explained using the extant theory (Ariño, 
LeBaron, & Miliken, 2016). Such exploratory empirical research in turn inspires future 
theory-building and testing. With this aim in mind, we conducted a cross-country comparative 
case study, analyzing the institutional strategies applied by Uber and Airbnb as they attempt 
to gain legitimacy and fuel growth in different geographic locations with different levels of 
institutionalization and different responses from key stakeholders.  
Case Selection  
As indicated above, we focused our study on the two canonical SE firms in the largest SE 
sectors: Uber in transportation and Airbnb in accommodation. Uber and Airbnb are Silicon 
Valley startups that were established in 2009 and 2008, respectively. At present, they rank 
among the largest SE firms in terms of market evaluation. Both firms have a strong focus on 
international expansion (Huet, 2014; Solomon, 2016).
6
 While trying to establish market 
presence in various geographic locations, Uber and Airbnb must adapt to these countries and 
                                                 
6
 In May 2017, Uber was active in 82 countries while Airbnb was active in 191 countries. 
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strategically respond to the actions of key stakeholders such as governments, incumbent 
firms, industry associations, and communities. 
In addition to providing a comparison between these two firms in their market entry 
strategy, we also compared them across different countries, introducing variance in the levels 
of institutionalization—i.e., the extent to which institutions facilitate market transactions and 
their resistance to change. First, to represent a country with a higher degree of 
institutionalization, we selected the Netherlands. The Netherlands ranks among the top 10 
most innovative countries in the world (Weller, 2016), with progressive socio-economic 
characteristics—e.g., higher levels of interpersonal trust (World Value Survey, 2014), digital 
literacy and awareness of the SE—and infrastructural conditions (e.g., technological and 
financial) that fuels the growth of the SE. In 2015, to make legislation “future proof” in the 
Netherlands, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs conducted research and developed an 
official policy for SE initiatives. The main conclusion was that the existing legislation was 
sufficient and that governing action should follow a case-by-case approach and be taken at the 
appropriate level (i.e., national, regional, or local) to prevent excessive regulation (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2015). No specific actions were taken at the national level to actively 
support SE initiatives. With Amsterdam being the epicenter of SE activity in the Netherlands, 
the municipality of Amsterdam takes a leading role in initiating legislation for SE initiatives. 
ShareNL, a knowledge and networking platform, also plays an important role as the research 
and informal networking intermediary for (mainly local) SE firms in the Netherlands. 
ShareNL emerged bottom-up upon the request of the local, smaller SE firms and explicitly 
positions itself as “an independent SE knowledge platform.” It provides consultancy services 
to municipalities, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and other governmental institutions both 
14 
 
 
at the EU and international levels. In sum, the Netherlands has many active (local) 
institutions, but no central trade association representing the interests of SE firms.
7
 
To compare and contrast the Netherlands with another country of high 
institutionalization, we added the United Kingdom (the UK) to our analysis. While the UK 
also has a higher degree of institutionalization; unlike in the Netherlands, the government in 
the UK has taken a more proactive stance toward the SE through a wide range of policy 
interventions at the national level. For example, speaking at an event at the House of 
Commons, Matthew Hancock, the UK Minister for Digital and Culture, stated that the 
Government seeks to make the UK “the natural home of the SE.” Similarly, in 2014, the 
Communities Secretary, Eric Pickles, issued guidance to local councils to enable driveway 
sharing by residents through platforms such as Justpark.  
In addition, the SE trade association, Sharing Economy UK (SEUK), has been very 
active since its founding, lobbying to gain influence for SE firms both in the political circles 
and in the public. SEUK’s first official employee was the niece of an influential minister, 
which its founders described as “not a coincidence.” SEUK also partnered with researchers at 
a top UK university to develop and introduce “the trust seal,” a set of quality measures that 
member organizations could follow to increase consumers’ trust. Overall, the UK presents a 
contrast to the Netherlands in the proactive approach of the government and the important 
role of the SE trade association in the development of the SE.  
To represent a country with lower levels of institutionalization, we selected Egypt as 
our third case. Since the start of the Arab revolution in 2011, governmental institutions have 
deteriorated in Egypt; creating a regulatory regime that is unable to enforce the necessary 
                                                 
7
 There is a newly founded trade association “Nederlandse Vereniging van Deel platformen” (Dutch Association 
of Sharing Economy platforms) that aims to represent the commercial interests of Dutch SE firms. However, at 
the time of writing, it only had three confirmed members, two of which (Heel Nederland Deelt and Floow2) are 
associated with the founder of the association. Thus, the Dutch SE association is currently not active and has 
limited impact.  
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rules for a safe and stable (business) environment (Abdelhafez, 2015). Egypt is facing many 
grand socio-economic and infrastructural challenges, such as poverty, unemployment, access 
to public transport, and the safety of women. In addition, the Egyptian society is characterized 
by low levels of interpersonal trust (World Value Survey, 2014). Given these socio-economic 
and infrastructural conditions, it is not surprising that an official government policy on the SE 
is still not developed. There are also no formal industry associations. However, Egypt has a 
very high mobile phone penetration rate (108.5%), and a large number of citizens use 
smartphones (~ 30 million
8
), which creates opportunities for online platforms to flourish. An 
overview of the institutional conditions per country is provided in Table 1. 
----------------------Insert Table 1 about here---------------------- 
Data Collection 
In each country, we combined in-depth interviews with secondary sources and archival data, 
such as newspaper articles or government documents (see Table 2 for further details). Our 
data collection includes representatives from four different stakeholder groups: i) global SE 
firms, i.e., Uber and Airbnb, ii) government institutions (ministries, members of parliament, 
and municipalities), iii) incumbent firms (e.g., taxis or hotels) and industry associations that 
represent these incumbent firms, and iv) local SE firms. While Uber and Airbnb provided 
information primarily on their strategic actions, interviews with the government institutions, 
industry associations, and local SE firms allowed us to provide a more holistic overview of 
the stakeholders on which these strategies had effects. In addition, we also conducted informal 
interviews with taxi drivers and Airbnb hosts to better understand the local SE conditions. 
Interviewing a multilateral set of stakeholders allowed us to triangulate the data and the 
patterns emerging from them; reducing the possibility of misinterpretation of interview data 
or the events described in newspaper articles.  
                                                 
8
 Numbers taken from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (2015).  
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The interviews took place during 2016 and 2017, typically lasted between 45 and 75 
minutes and were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim for coding. We conducted the 
majority of interviews face-to-face; however, we also used various (online) platforms, 
including Skype, Google Hangouts, and telephone interviews, when necessary. Non-English 
(i.e., Dutch or Arabic) interviews were transcribed and translated to English. During the 
interviews, we asked the informants about the entry of Uber and Airbnb; however, we also 
sparked open discussions about the benefits and risks of the SE as a whole and for each 
stakeholder. This allowed the interviewees to reflect upon the SE in general rather than only 
on the industry in which they operate. Finally, secondary data sources complemented our 
data, allowing us to obtain an understanding of why some of the institutional strategies were 
successful and how they shaped the institutions. Table 2 provides an overview of all 
interviews and secondary data sources.  
----------------------Insert Table 2 about here---------------------- 
Data Analysis 
We analyzed the data using the procedures recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
Strauss and Corbin (1990). Open and axial coding were applied to the data to label and 
classify meaningful pieces of information. We began our analysis with open coding of the 
interviews, which included summarizing all of the transcripts to build basic blocks of data and 
to saturate categories (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The initial codes 
covered topics such as “hiring politically connected people” or “protest by taxi drivers.” 
Consistent with our abductive approach, we then followed an iterative process of moving 
back and forth between theory and data (by using constant comparison), and used axial coding 
to categorize these first-order codes into more abstract theoretical dimensions and the 
concepts relevant to our research (see Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Suddaby, 2006). We were 
guided by the theoretical discoveries provided by our analysis. Following the individual 
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readings of the transcripts and codes, we also organized numerous discussions among 
ourselves to saturate the categories. Figure 2 displays the eleven categories that emerged and 
how they are linked to more aggregate dimensions. We include three main aggregate 
dimensions: i. firm institutional strategies (consisting of market and non-market strategies), ii. 
reactions by SE stakeholders to these strategies, and iii. the outcomes of the strategies in terms 
of government interventions (positive or negative for SE firms) as well as firm performance. 
----------------------Insert Figure 2 about here---------------------- 
As our unit of analysis is the firm, we structured our analysis around Uber and Airbnb 
and analyzed their institutional strategies in each country. To reflect the dynamics within each 
country and the perceptions of all stakeholders, we also built on the interview data with local 
SE firms and other actors. These interviews provided valuable insights, for example, into 
whether certain strategies created (or destroyed) value for multiple stakeholders. The final 
step involved a cross-case analysis identifying the similarities and differences among 
strategies applied by SE firms in different institutional settings, reactions to these strategies by 
key stakeholders, and the consequences of these strategies (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990; Yin, 2003). This cross-case analysis allowed us to blend a process-based 
logic within our cases of Uber and Airbnb—i.e., how SE firms gained legitimacy over time—
with a variance-based logic, comparing variations across different sectoral and country 
contexts. In other words, we compared how the strategies pursued by Uber and Airbnb in each 
country resulted in different outcomes in different countries, and why. This variance in 
process analysis provides the basis for our discoveries, discussed below. 
FINDINGS 
In this section, we report the findings and compare the institutional strategies of Uber and 
Airbnb in Netherlands, the UK, and Egypt. We report each case in chronological order with a 
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focus on the coevolution between these firms’ institutional strategies and the responses by key 
stakeholders (e.g., incumbent firms, trade associations, the public, regulators).  
Uber in the Netherlands 
With the official launch of UberBlack and UberLux in April 2012, Amsterdam was one of the 
first European cities that Uber entered. Unlike most countries, where the numbers of both 
taxis and taxi companies are regulated, only the number of taxi companies that can use local 
taxi stands (usually situated near stations, tourist sites, airports) is subject to regulation in the 
Netherlands.
9
 As Uber does not use official taxi stands, it did not face any entry barriers.  
At first, reactions from stakeholders were surprisingly positive. A board member of 
the Royal Dutch Transportation Association explains why: 
Unlike most countries, taxi companies in the Netherlands are used to new competitors 
entering the market… At first, many competitors looked at Uber as an interesting new 
concept / technology and they were especially impressed by Uber’s positioning and 
marketing. (Board member, Royal Dutch Transportation Association) 
 
Although Uber did not conform to all the rules, e.g., not making use of a taxi meter or 
board computer, the Dutch transportation association decided not to contest the company. 
Uber’s frame and marketing is that they are a new technology company and the taxi 
industry is old-fashioned and is resisting change. Every time we mentioned in the 
media that they do not fit the existing regulation, this image was confirmed and it 
strengthened their marketing message. So, we quickly decided not to criticize Uber on 
these minor issues anymore. (Board member, Royal Dutch Transportation 
Association) 
 
However, this positive atmosphere quickly changed upon the introduction of 
UberPop.
10
 According to Dutch law, individuals are not allowed to transport persons for 
financial compensation without a valid license, approved car, board computer, taxi meter, and 
insurance. In reaction, taxi drivers and taxi companies united and organized protests against 
UberPop. In addition, the Royal Dutch Transportation Association highlighted in the political 
                                                 
9
 This regulation was effective as of 2011 as part of the liberalization of the taxi market (which started in 2000), 
and it was put into place with the intention of creating a more competitive market. 
10
 UberPop (or UberX) offers unlicensed taxi service, allowing everyone to transport anyone in private cars. 
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domain that the UberPop service was illegal and created unfair competition. In Amsterdam, 
the police started fining UberPop drivers. Uber’s strategic response was quite aggressive (also 
see Frenken, Waes, Smink, & Est, 2017). They contested the law by stating that they are a 
technology company and that the law was outdated. This reaction had little effect, and in early 
2014, the Ministry of Infrastructure fined Uber. Shortly after, as Uber kept the UberPop 
service running, the fine for Uber was raised to € 50,000 per UberPop ride (with a maximum 
of € 1 million). Uber again responded aggressively by taking the Dutch state to court and 
retaining the UberPop service. In December 2014, Uber lost the court case.  
Interestingly, during a parliamentary debate in 2015, almost all parties acknowledged 
that regulatory changes were needed to enable innovation in the Dutch taxi market. In 
addition, there was political support to make changes to the taxi law that would partially 
legalize the UberPop business model. Despite this goodwill, Uber’s disruptive and 
transformative strategy did not help in realizing these institutional changes. The board 
member of the Royal Dutch Transportation Association illustrated Uber’s transformative 
approach at that time: 
In 2015, we [Royal Dutch Transportation Association and Uber] were both lobbying 
for changes in the Taxi Law, although with different end-goals. We disagreed on a 
number of issues and we thought it would be good to simply meet and discuss our 
different views. We were invited to their [Uber’s] head office in Amsterdam, but we 
just received a standard marketing talk. It was never a real discussion or debate. 
(Member of the board, Royal Dutch Transportation Association) 
 
In the beginning of 2016, Uber hired two influential figures to increase their political 
influence: Neelie Kroes, the former Dutch European Commissioner, and Bart de Liefde, a 
member of the Dutch parliament. However, Uber’s institutional strategy remained aggressive, 
e.g., recommending its non-licensed drivers to use the licenses of other taxi drivers when they 
were inactive. Again, this strategy backfired, and in November 2016 Uber was fined € 
650,000. The SE policy officer of the municipality of Amsterdam explains their response:  
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UberPop did not conform to existing regulations, creating unfair competition with 
existing taxi companies. We see UberPop as just another business model where rules 
are already there and because their drivers do not have all the required licenses, we 
cannot guarantee that their taxi rides are safe.  
 
Uber chose defiance in the Netherlands with the hope of reaching a scale large enough 
to give it a fighting chance in the courts. In a response to UberPop’s ban, Uber has adapted a 
more relational approach:  
Our regular disruptive strategy [the initial strategy that Uber tried in the Netherlands] 
backfired. We had difficulties in getting around the table with the government since 
they regarded our service as illegal. Now that we have discontinued UberPop, it is 
much easier to talk to the government… Our main strategy is a more gradual approach 
now, showing the government that we work to comply with the rules and seeing if we 
can decrease legislation one step at a time. The government plays a major role and we 
can lobby to extend the boundaries of our elbow room. (Operation manager Uber) 
 
The municipality agreed that with more gradual and relational strategies, Uber would 
have better chances of establishing themselves as a legitimate player in the Dutch market: 
Uber has learnt their lesson... They have a very clever app and some interesting things 
are happening there. If one can link Uber’s app to the taxi-tracking system of the 
government, then why do you still need an expensive board computer in each taxi? 
These are discussions if their app can deliver the same results and this would lower the 
barriers for new taxi drivers. Also, the law still states that you need to provide a receipt 
when you pay for a taxi ride. This is ridiculous of course. We now had talks at the 
national level saying that UberPop is banned but there are some very interesting 
elements that we perhaps should change the existing regulations to accommodate 
them. (SE policy advisor municipality of Amsterdam) 
 
Airbnb in the Netherlands 
The first Airbnb listings in the Netherlands started appearing in the beginning of 2009. After 
2011, the number of listings started to increase exponentially, and, by the end of 2015, there 
were approximately 20,000 listings in the Netherlands, half of which were in Amsterdam.  
The SE policy advisor of the Municipality of Amsterdam highlighted that there was no 
“real regulation on house sharing” and Airbnb was free to operate in the Netherlands. 
However, as Airbnb scaled up in Amsterdam and issues such as an increased number of 
tourists and misbehaving renters emerged, Airbnb adopted a relational and additive strategic 
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approach. In 2014, the municipality and Airbnb agreed on a set of rules to limit the negative 
outcomes of short-term rentals for stakeholders, e.g., inconvenience for neighbors (a 
maximum of four guests), unfair competition for hotels (apartments to be rented out for 60 
days per year and guests pay tourist taxes), and the lack of safety for users (houses to conform 
to basic fire regulations).
11
 There was some resistance from the Royal Dutch Hospitality 
Association, which argued that Airbnb created unfair competition against hotels that are 
subject to stricter regulations (Frenken et al., 2017). However, this lobby did not become 
influential enough, partly due to the booming tourism sector in Amsterdam and the additional 
revenue Airbnb created for other hospitality businesses, such as restaurants. Airbnb quickly 
responded to such discussions by organizing meet-ups with hosts to discuss regulation and 
safety issues, and they retained a close relationship with the municipality: 
Airbnb regularly organizes meet-ups with new hosts to which we [the municipality 
of Amsterdam] are also invited. They discuss how owners can be a good host, tax 
regulations, and safety and fire regulations. These are always great meet-ups. (SE 
Policy Advisor Municipality of Amsterdam) 
 
2016, however, represented a turning point in terms of the relationship between 
Airbnb and the Dutch government. The number of Airbnb listings in Amsterdam alone had 
grown beyond 12,500, and residents began to protest against the amount of tourists in their 
local communities.
12
 When research by ING Bank (ING Economic Research, 2016) showed 
that Airbnb has led to a significant increase in housing prices in the already extortionate 
Amsterdam housing market (Dutch Central Bank, 2016), a larger debate began on the 
negative impact of Airbnb. Airbnb reacted by providing their own analysis and downplaying 
the discussed effects; however, this had little impact.  
                                                 
11
 Amsterdam, London and New York were among the first cities to co-develop house-sharing regulation with 
Airbnb. 
12
 Per 100 inhabitants, there are approximately 1.52 active Airbnb listings in Amsterdam versus 0.38 in London. 
22 
 
 
In addition, as Airbnb does not share individual-level data on property owners 
(Frenken et al., 2017),
13
 the municipality could not track which hosts were paying taxes 
(Airbnb only handles tourist taxes), renting out their apartment for more than 60 days, or 
renting to more than four tourists at a time.
14
 To solve this problem, the municipality 
introduced ‘Airbnb cops.’ Consistent with their additive strategy, Airbnb responded by 
opening a complaint reporting service; however, this was perceived as insufficient by key 
stakeholders (i.e., residents, municipality). The municipality of Amsterdam teamed up with 
cities such as New York, Paris, and Barcelona to discuss actions against Airbnb and how to 
force Airbnb to provide individual-level data on property owners.
15
 During our interview with 
the Chief Economist of Airbnb, we were told that Airbnb was willing to provide additional 
and individual-level data (already occurring in Chicago and New Orleans) but that this would 
not solve the problems because most municipalities were not equipped and resourceful 
enough for processing such big data.
16
  
----------------------Insert Table 3 about here ---------------------- 
Table 3 shows the change in the allocation of costs and benefits among key 
stakeholders as Airbnb grows over time. In the emergence stage (t = 0), Airbnb did not harm 
the interests of major stakeholder groups. However, as it grew in scale over time, the benefits 
of Airbnb increased at the cost of others (cf. Dorobantu et al., 2017). Increased discontent 
among key stakeholders created pressure on Airbnb, and Airbnb’s additive strategies seemed 
unable to counter such effects. The founder of a local SE firm in the Netherlands described 
the evolution of Airbnb over time as follows:  
                                                 
13
 According to EU regulation, digital platforms are allowed to protect the privacy of their users.  
14
 Research by Dutch journalists shows that Airbnb hosts frequently violate the 60-day policy. 
15
 Shortly afterwards, Airbnb provided additional data to the municipality of Amsterdam. The municipality, 
however, indicated that such data were not sufficiently detailed to effectively enforce the existing regulations.  
16
 In a recent attempt to reduce the nuisance caused by Airbnb tourists, the municipality of Amsterdam 
announced to decrease the maximum number of nights a private home may be rented from 60 to 30 days on 
January 10, 2018. The labor party has even called for a ban on Airbnb-type temporary stay rental platforms, and 
made it a part of the party's mandate for the upcoming (March 2018) municipal elections. 
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I always looked at Airbnb as a primary example of a successful, international, SE 
firm that made a positive impact on communities. More recently, this has changed. 
People are experiencing lots of trouble with Airbnb tourists and as such they 
[Airbnb] are creating costs for society…. They [Airbnb] could also take a more 
active governing role but I guess the profits are more important than the effects on 
the city. The founding story of Airbnb is still great, but they are not about sharing 
and local community building anymore. (Founder, Dutch SE firm) 
 
To compare the Netherlands with another country with a high degree of 
institutionalization but where the government has taken a more proactive stance toward the 
SE, we describe the findings for Uber and Airbnb in the UK below. 
Uber in the UK 
Uber arrived in London in 2012, just before the London Olympics. From the beginning, it 
used an aggressive driver recruiting strategy, making drivers a special introductory offer: they 
received a free iPhone and £25 an hour regardless of whether they completed any trips. In the 
words of Uber’s first UK executive: “We gave these guys a security that they didn’t 
previously have.” After six months, Uber began to replace the guaranteed hourly rate with pay 
by commission, which continued to boost driver acquisition. This process led to 40,000 Uber 
drivers in London alone in 2017, while the number of black cab drivers remained at 25,000. 
Similar to the Dutch case, Uber triggered a defensive response by key stakeholders 
and, subsequently, the government. In June 2014, thousands of taxi drivers protested, closing 
off London roads and bridges. Reflecting on a meeting with the government at that time, the 
chairman of the London Cab Drivers Club made the following statement:  
I’m from a working-class family; I grew up in social housing. I said, ‘I believed in the 
conservative ethos: Work hard, better myself. I don’t want no benefits. But what you 
have done is you’re killing us for an American company that is paying taxes in the 
Netherlands. (Chairman, London Cab Drivers Club) 
 
Uber’s relationship with regulators and the government has been relatively hostile ever 
since. In London, for example, Uber has been taken to court by the local transportation 
authority, Transport for London (TfL), several times since 2015. While the first two cases, in 
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which TfL sued Uber for using its app as a taximeter and for not observing the mandatory 
wait time of five minutes by private-ride customers before they could begin their journey, 
were rejected, the third case finally had an impact on Uber. In October 2016, Uber lost its 
right to classify its drivers as self-employed and was forced to pay its drivers a national living 
wage and holiday pay. The ruling came as a landmark in employment law towards preventing 
Internet platforms that avoid employment taxes over £300 m annually by listing their service 
providers as self-employed. Uber’s reaction to these court cases and proposed rules was to 
protest aggressively and to frame the issue as a matter of personal freedom and ask its users to 
put pressure on local authorities. The regional general manager of Uber in the UK stated the 
following:  
Tens of thousands of people in London drive with Uber precisely because they want to 
be self-employed and their own boss. The overwhelming majority of drivers who use 
the Uber app want to keep the freedom and flexibility of being able to drive when and 
where they want. (Regional general manager, Uber) 
 
Uber went on to appeal the decision and was still awaiting the result by the time of 
data collection. In addition to the TfL, Uber has also been in a hostile relationship with the 
UK government. For instance, the Labor Business Minister Long-Bailey publicly stated in 
2017 that using Uber was “not morally acceptable.” Other ministers have advised the UK 
government that London should cap the number of Uber cars due to congestion and pollution.  
Public interest groups have also been increasingly hostile. Together with the General 
Municipal Boilermakers (GMB) union (the general trade union for the UK), they petitioned 
TfL not to renew Uber’s license that was to expire in September 2017 unless it guaranteed 
safe working practices and basic employment rights. As an attempt to reduce the hostility 
from the various stakeholders in its environment, the Head of Policy for Uber in the UK stated 
the following in 2017:  
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We know drivers want more security which is why we're already investing in 
discounted illness and injury cover, and will be introducing further improvements 
soon. (Head of Policy, Uber) 
  
These announcements were insufficient, and on September 22, TfL announced that 
Uber’s license would not be renewed. The use of controversial technology to avoid local 
legislation along with the company's approach to reporting criminal offences, obtaining 
medical certificates, and obtaining criminal record checks was cited by the TfL as the main 
reasons for not renewing Uber's license (Chapman, 2017). Currently, Uber is waiting for the 
appeal, and CEO Khosrowshahi admitted that the company had “got things wrong” and 
apologized for the “mistakes … made.”  
Overall, however, Uber has not shown any specific efforts to legitimize itself through 
relational strategies such as community service and cooperation with local authorities as 
Airbnb has, as discussed below. Instead, Uber has relied much more on increasing demand 
and supply for its service commercially and legitimizing itself by obtaining a large user base. 
Uber’s campaign “Keep London Moving,” which included advertisements, discounts, and a 
petition signed by over 200,000 people, is an example of this approach. It is interesting to note 
that one of the early decisions of SEUK, the UK’s SE trading association, was to not let Uber 
become a member due to Uber’s “controversial” practices that would “damage the reputation 
and influence of the organization.”  
Airbnb in the UK 
A comparison of Airbnb and Uber regarding the approaches they have taken to establish 
themselves in the UK reveals patterns that are similar to those in the Netherlands. The first 
Airbnb listings in London were available as of 2009; however, Airbnb officially entered the 
UK in early 2012. At present, London has one of the highest numbers of active Airbnb 
listings in the world, just behind Paris and New York. According to the Airbnb UK 
community manager, the platform prides itself on entering new markets through 
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“collaboration and communication with local authorities and community.” As part of its 
relational and additive strategy, Airbnb created multiple community and public related 
positions in its UK headquarters, e.g., global and country community managers, a public 
relations manager, and a head of policy. In London, where it is most active, Airbnb worked 
hand-in-hand with the municipality from the beginning by providing them information about 
the growth of tourism in London’s outer boroughs to help spread the economic benefits across 
the city:  
On Monday we released a report with the Mayor’s office in London talking about 
how it was the outer borough of London that were seen as the biggest growth in terms 
of tourism or at least Airbnb guests and then people were gravitating more towards 
the outer borough. The outer boroughs were growing something like 20-25 
percentage points faster than the area that we are in now. The tourism board actually 
helps to promote. Certainly most city tourism boards have a problem of how do you 
disperse tourism receipts across the city rather than it just staying very centralized. 
(UK Community Manager, Airbnb) 
 
In addition to providing information to the municipality, Airbnb organizes regular 
events for hosts to give them information and to help with issues such as fire safety, taxation 
or how to provide better service. It also works with local fire departments to improve fire 
safety in homes and neighborhoods, particularly in poorer ones. The company frames these 
relational and additive strategies as “giving back to the community,” which executives say 
helps improve the company’s image and gives them an advantage in local and government-
level affairs.  
We have worked with two fire officers associations as to what is an appropriate level 
of safety and we have also done a lot of work to actually help facilitate people in 
getting things like fire extinguishers if they don’t have them... Naturally, our efforts to 
create a win-win relationship with local authorities pay off. (UK Community Manager, 
Airbnb) 
 
[We] work with them on how to make these better places to live as well as better 
places to visit. And so that’s also about what the impact to our community is in terms 
of the housing or promoting how our guests can be more respectful. (UK Public 
Relations Manager, Airbnb) 
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Finally, Airbnb has been a founding member of the SEUK, the trading body for SE 
firms in the UK. One of the global executives of Airbnb describes how supporting this trading 
body was important for Airbnb although, strictly speaking, it was not needed:  
It is important for us to fit into our environment and support our environment. This 
includes supporting smaller sharing platforms that could provide complementary 
services to us. Of course, while doing that, we also support smaller competitors, but 
this needs to happen…It matters because when you lobby, it’s very different to 
represent the entire UK sharing platforms versus when you do it just for yourself. 
(Global Community Manager, Airbnb) 
 
Airbnb’s strategy of building close relationships with local authorities and smaller 
competitors, combined with the UK government’s centralized and positive approach to SE 
firms has paid off. For instance, in 2015, Airbnb negotiated a more favorable deal with the 
city of London in comparison with Amsterdam, which allowed residents to rent their rooms or 
homes for up to 90 days per year and earn up to £7,500 without having to file taxes. This 
helped Airbnb grow exponentially from 1 million guests in 2015 to 4 million in 2017. Of 
course, there was some backlash, but it was at smaller scale.
17
 Airbnb addressed these issues 
more proactively in the UK. For instance, in 2017, Airbnb started delisting London 
apartments that do not have change-of-use permission after a 90-day stay. An Airbnb 
interviewee explained:  
At Airbnb UK, we consider our hosts kind of like suppliers. We feel and work with 
them as our business partners rather than as our customers so we are all in it together 
as part of a way to help people to have great trips and to provide hospitality. But since 
these are business partners, they need to fulfill their legal obligations as well. (UK 
Public Relations Manager, Airbnb) 
 
A first comparison of Uber and Airbnb in countries with higher levels of 
institutionalization reveals that these firms apply distinct institutional strategies. Uber follows 
a disruptive and transformative approach to influence existing regulations and seeks to obtain 
                                                 
17
 In comparison with Amsterdam, the number Airbnb listings per inhabitant is substantially lower in London. At 
the time of writing, there were 33,636 active Airbnb listings in London, which is equal to approximately 0.38 
listings per 100 inhabitants. In Amsterdam, the number of active listings per 100 inhabitants is 1.52, i.e., which is 
4 times higher. 
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asymmetric advantages (Dorobantu et al., 2017), eliciting strong reactions from incumbents 
and other stakeholders in the process. In contrast, Airbnb adopts a relational and additive 
approach characterized by collaboration with key stakeholders, self-regulation, and 
supplementing existing institutional structures with new ones (cf. Marquis & Raynard 2015; 
Dorobantu et al., 2017). The comparison between the Netherlands and the UK further shows 
that whether the additive approach can lead to legitimacy depends on a) the government’s 
stance towards regulating the new product or service, and b) the ability of the firm to sustain a 
positive (or at least neutral) value proposition for key stakeholders in the country. Before we 
discuss these factors in detail in the discoveries section, we present our third country 
comparison of Uber and Airbnb in Egypt, which provides insights into institutional strategies 
in a context with lower degrees of institutionalization.  
Uber in Egypt 
As in the Netherlands and the UK, Egyptian incumbent firms and taxi drivers described 
concerns about unfair competition upon Uber’s entry (particularly in Cairo). However, the 
protests were more severe. In the beginning of 2016, taxi drivers blocked the streets of Cairo 
to protest Uber, which they characterized as an illegal taxi service. Strikes were not the only 
way taxi drivers reacted against Uber. A member of the Egyptian parliament explains other 
reactions: 
When Uber entered Egypt, it was illegal for a privately-owned car to operate as a 
limousine. Taxi drivers were deliberately ordering rides just to turn them into the 
police. The police were cooperating because many taxi cars are owned by police 
officers and they split the profit with the drivers. When we first took notice of the 
protests by the taxis, our first instinct was to ban Uber’s services. You have to 
understand we are in a position where every move counts and is being watched. We 
cannot afford bad days again in the international press. (Egyptian Parliament Member) 
 
However, an emerging country such as Egypt faces grand socio-economic challenges 
that can create win-win outcomes between government institutions and SE firms. The 
manager of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt explains this as follows:  
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The benefits from mobile services of SE firms may be greater in countries with less 
developed ‘old’ infrastructure but a high penetration of mobile phones. Innovation 
may actually prove less disruptive as it does not destroy jobs—simply because they 
did not exist in the first place. (Manager, American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt) 
 
Countries with higher degrees of institutionalization usually offer well-developed and 
functioning infrastructural conditions, such as an efficient public transport system (e.g., taxis, 
busses, trains, metro). In Egypt, however, there are no established taxi stations, on-demand 
cab services, and some areas do not have access to public transportation at all. Combined with 
high unemployment rates, this provides Uber with the opportunity to address these problems 
and leverage the power it gains to transform institutions to their advantage. The Egyptian 
parliament member told us that the most important challenges that Uber addressed in Egypt 
were i) public safety and, in particular, the sexual harassment of women
18
, ii) unemployment, 
and iii) access to public transportation. He explained how Uber helps address such problems, 
especially when the government has difficulty in enforcing protective and preventive laws and 
regulations:  
Safety for women in public transportation is an issue we take very seriously. The high 
percentage of harassment, particularly in public transportation, is one of our top 
priorities. With technological solutions such as tracking and rating systems, this issue 
can be policed more heavily when using platform technologies. There are even a large 
number of women working as drivers in these platforms. (Egyptian Parliament 
Member) 
 
Our data show that Uber used transformative strategies tailored to the local conditions 
to achieve legitimacy. A strict enforcement of their internal governance mechanisms to 
address safety and sexual harassment in public transport was one of the most effective ways to 
quickly gain social approval and legitimacy in the Egyptian market:   
We had a woman who rated a driver poorly and wrote ‘sexual harassment’ as a 
comment. 30 minutes later we emailed her apologizing for the incident, explaining the 
procedure we took with the driver. We refunded her trip and gave her extra ride 
                                                 
18
 According to the United Nations, 99.3 percent of women in Egypt have experienced some form of sexual 
harassment; with 81 percent reporting frequent harassment while using public transportation. 
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credits. The driver was banned from Uber services and was reported to the authorities. 
(Operations Manager Uber Egypt) 
 
In terms of gaining legitimacy, this move helped Uber establish their position in Egypt 
in two ways. First, it helped Uber communicate the benefits of its technology to potential 
customers. In the Egyptian context, reactions to low ratings proved to be extremely effective 
in Uber’s efforts to gain legitimacy. Stories such as the one quoted above are posted regularly 
on Uber Egypt’s social media pages. Within 72 hours, the above story was the most shared 
story on Egyptian social media, and Uber rides spiked. Uber has used such incidents 
strategically to show (potential) customers how Uber aims to help the government regulate the 
market for both suppliers and consumers, ensuring safety, stability, and convenience, as well 
as consistency in transportation services. Such actions increase awareness among (potential) 
customers and legitimatize the services offered by Uber.  
Second, these strategic moves also show the government how Uber can create value 
by solving grand societal challenges. This way, despite the protests by taxi drivers in Cairo, 
Uber was allowed to operate officially. The operations manager of Uber Egypt explains how 
they used societal problems to highlight the added value of Uber to the Egyptian market: 
Taxis in Egypt regularly refuse service to customers if they feel like the destination is 
not to their liking. This is not possible with our drivers. You pick where you want to 
go, and if a problem like that happens, the customer can give the driver 1-star and 
leave a comment explaining the situation. They can then watch us react. Moreover, 
safety is our main pillar. If providing high quality is one of our main targets, safety is 
even higher on the list. We are working with HarassMap
19
 and educating our drivers 
on sexual harassment to make sure these incidents do not occur. We also do not 
hesitate to take the most severe measures possible when such an issue occurs. 
(Operations Manager, Uber Egypt) 
 
--------------------Insert Figure 3 about here---------------------- 
                                                 
19
 HarassMap is a mobile and online non-profit technology that uses interactive mapping to try to reduce the 
social acceptability of sexual harassment throughout Egypt. 
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Figure 3 shows the stickers used by Uber in Egypt to signal the safety of their rides. 
Such actions help Uber gain legitimacy and establish its market presence. The Egyptian 
parliament member explains how they view the role of SE firms in the transportation sector: 
They [SE firms] still don’t count for even 1% of the transportation market and they 
have already solved a huge problem for a lot of people. They are collectively adding 
about 50,000 jobs and counting. The technology is also allowing women to feel safe 
when using transportation. This is a priority for us and innovative solutions are always 
welcome. (Egyptian Parliament Member) 
 
So far these platforms are solving a number of transportation and employment issues 
for a large segment of the population. This is why we are working hard to 
accommodate these platforms further and really establish them as key players in the 
transport industry. We are hoping this sends a message to anyone with an innovative 
idea that we are willing to work together for the good of this economy and the good of 
this country. (Egyptian Parliament Member) 
 
The challenges faced by Uber in Egypt are, however, more complex. Uber must adapt 
to local conditions and deploy infrastructure-building strategies (cf. Marquis & Raynard, 
2015) to gain legitimacy among key stakeholders. For example, Uber is currently investing 
E₤500 million (approximately $ 27.9 million) to optimize the quality of the GPS system in 
Egypt. This move strengthens their relationship with the government; however, it is also 
important for Uber itself, as noted by a driver:  
In Egypt the GPS system is still not perfect. We have to constantly contact our clients 
by phone to reach our pickup destinations. The roads as well, the roads are breaking 
our cars in half. Some clients understand and walk to pick up points on the main roads, 
others ask us to drive into roads that most SUV’s wouldn’t survive in. (Uber driver) 
 
Crucially, the operations manager of Uber Egypt suggests that success depends on 
whether SE firms can establish themselves as local firms. To achieve this, they must adapt 
their technologies and procedures to the local infrastructural conditions. For example, while 
the penetration of mobile services has reached 108.5% of the total population, only 2% have 
credit cards. This means that global SE firms must adapt their platforms to the local 
conditions:  
32 
 
 
If you want to appeal to the general population, you need to allow cash transaction, 
and it was one of our biggest moves. Since that addition, our rides have gone up like 
crazy. (Operations Manager Uber Egypt) 
 
Airbnb in Egypt 
Tourism is one of the most important sectors in Egypt. At its peak in the period from 2009 to 
2010, approximately 12% of the working population was employed in the tourism sector 
(Dziadosz, 2009) with over 14 million tourists visiting the country on an annual basis (World 
Bank, 2015). After the Arab revolution in 2011, and a series of incidents of political unrest 
that led to the deterioration of government institutions, the popular press and foreign 
governments raised serious concerns about the safety of tourists.
20
 As a result, the number of 
tourists plummeted after 2011 with only 9 million tourists visiting Egypt in 2015 (World 
Bank, 2015).  
Similar to the UK and the Netherlands, the first Airbnb listings in Egypt were already 
available as of 2009. However, although Lonely Planet ranked Sharm el-Sheikh among the 
top 10 trending Airbnb destinations worldwide in 2017 (Butler, 2017), Airbnb has been 
unable to become a major player in the Egyptian market. Most crucially, this is due to its 
inability to adapt to local conditions and, in particular, to successfully encourage trust 
between lenders and borrowers. Given the current image of safety in Egypt and traveling 
recommendations by foreign governments, staying in a private home in Egypt is seen as very 
risky (Ert, Fleischer, Magen, 2016; Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002). As a result, the vast 
majority of Airbnb listings in Egypt consist of official hotels and holiday resorts that use 
Airbnb as an additional outlet. Airbnb’s inability to facilitate trust in the Egyptian context was 
well captured during our interviews.  
A lot of people who book never show up and even if they do, they are usually 
surprised that the place actually looks like in the pictures. You will find a lot of people 
                                                 
20
At present, the UK government still has a negative travelling advisory to some parts of Egypt, and until the end 
of 2016, all direct flights from the UK to Sharm el-Sheikh were cancelled. 
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who keep their bags in the car until they come up and see the room. In practice, they 
book two or three different places and shop around when they arrive. (Host in Airbnb)  
 
Similar to the Netherlands and the UK, there were no major protests against Airbnb by 
industry incumbents (e.g., hotels, restaurants, and tourism associations). In addition, given the 
economic problems, local citizens and communities welcomed any extra income and 
employment generated through Airbnb tourists. The former CEO of NHS Tourism (one of 
largest tourism companies in Egypt) explains why he does not see Airbnb as a competitor: 
The market is big enough for both of us. Additional tourists are good for the country; 
they eat in our restaurants, and make use of some of our services. Anything that can 
increase tourism in Egypt is welcomed. (Former CEO, NHS Tourism) 
 
 While online hotel reservation websites such as Booking.com, Trivago, or Expedia 
have quickly become established players in the Egyptian market—relying more on traditional 
reputation mechanisms that better promote trust between service providers and customers—
Airbnb has been unable to develop similar or alternative reputation mechanisms and adapt to 
local conditions to legitimize their position.  
Airbnb is probably my least favorite option and there is relatively little activity on the 
platform. Booking.com is another story. Much more activity, more access to data so 
that you can improve your online offerings, and the option to add a cancellation fee. 
I’m now also applying for Expedia. There is a four-step process with an interview and 
training. They really implement quality-screening processes. (Host in Airbnb) 
 
 Whereas Airbnb’s relational and community building strategies are crucial in 
communities that are disrupted by Airbnb tourists, this seems not to be the case in the 
Egyptian setting. By not adapting to local conditions, Airbnb struggles to gain legitimacy in 
the Egyptian accommodation industry. However, Trivago recently hired famous YouTube and 
advertisement figures to legitimize their brand and cater to the local users.  
The app [Trivago] itself is similar to Airbnb and Booking.com but is specifically 
targeting the Middle East region and is an example of the hotel industry’s answer to 
Airbnb. (Marketing Executive, NHS Tourism) 
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Overview of Discoveries 
Our comparison of Uber and Airbnb in the Netherlands, the UK, and Egypt show that in all 
three countries, SE firms take strategic action to shape their institutional environment in their 
favor. However, similar strategies can result in different outcomes depending on the 
institutional environment in which these strategies are applied (see Table 4). For example, 
Uber managers in Egypt argue that the high popularity of the service is due to the peer-to-peer 
rating systems, mobile GPS tracking, and internal governance structures (i.e., eliminating 
misbehaving and/or noncompliant drivers), which represent an improvement to the existing 
infrastructure (e.g., government tracking systems, taxi licenses) to tackle societal challenges 
such as harassment, safety, and quality. As a whole, our case illustration of Uber’s successful 
transformational institutional approach in Egypt provides a striking example of how a firm 
can use grand societal problems to their advantage in a country where laws are in place but 
enforcement is limited due to lower degrees of institutionalization.
21
 Thus, our first discovery 
is that countries with a lower degree of institutionalization and larger societal problems offer 
firms an opportunity to address these problems and in turn achieve power to transform their 
institutional environment favorably at the national level. Compared to high degrees of 
institutionalization where there are less or no such problems, SE firms in emerging countries 
are able to grow with relatively little resistance by addressing societal problems through 
technology and community-based practices. A case in point is that UberPop is not banned in 
Egypt.  
Comparing Egypt to the Netherlands and the UK, our second discovery is that in 
countries with higher degrees of institutionalization, the legitimacy and commercial success 
                                                 
21
 Interestingly, while Airbnb works hand-in-hand with local authorities and addresses the needs of the 
communities in the Netherlands and the UK, it was not able to adapt to local needs or solve grand societal 
problems in Egypt (e.g., mistrust in society). One explanation of this could be that the company knows how to 
follow an additive strategy with existing institutions in a country; however, it does not know how to operate in 
institutional voids.  
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of SE firms has much less to do with their ability to solve grand societal problems, and much 
more with how they approach the existing institutions and key stakeholders in their 
environment. We find, for example, that disruptive and transformative strategies aimed at 
quickly changing the country’s regulations and institutions (e.g., Uber) can provide rapid 
gains; however, they are likely to backfire and lead to resistance from key stakeholders, such 
as regulators and incumbent firms. In comparison, more relational and additive strategies 
(e.g., Airbnb) allow for more opportunities to co-develop (new) regulations that provide more 
sustainable legitimacy gains. However, there is a limit to applying additive institutional 
strategies. As firms grow over time, other non-market stakeholders (e.g., residents of 
Amsterdam in the Netherlands Airbnb case) may be affected negatively. If firms do not 
adequately address such misalignments in their value proposition, they risk losing legitimacy.  
Finally, the third discovery reveals that whether acting locally and addressing the 
needs of the community leads to legitimation, and market penetration largely depends on the 
approach of the national government regarding the regulation of the new service or product. 
When governments play a more proactive role (e.g., in the UK), politically active industry 
associations and lobbying various higher institutional actors (e.g., ministers) offer additional 
opportunities to gain legitimacy and influence regulation. These institutional strategies also 
provide firms with better opportunities to pre-empt or counter resistance by other 
stakeholders. 
--------------------Insert Table 4 about here---------------------- 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Our exploratory empirical study of SE firms bridges and expands the extant research 
in various ways. At the broadest level, we contribute to the prior institutional theory research 
on firms’ strategic actions to influence the perceptions of key stakeholder groups in their 
institutional environment (Aldrich & Fiol 1994; Maguire et al., 2004; Gurses and Ozcan, 
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2015) by highlighting the diversity and contextual dependence of these institutional strategies. 
In particular, our findings emphasize the coevolution of firm strategy and the institutional 
environment in several ways, as detailed below.  
The Coevolution of Firm Strategy and the Institutional Environment 
First, we specify the different ways in which our focal firms can attempt to shape their 
institutional environment. We build on the recent typology provided by Dorobantu et al., 
(2017) that firms can employ additive or transformative strategies towards the existing 
institutional environment, and we link these strategies to different institutional environments 
for Uber and Airbnb. Specifically, we identify whether and how additive versus 
transformative strategies provide legitimacy gains in countries with high versus low degrees 
of institutionalization, as explained above. 
Our finding on how Uber could gain power and legitimacy more easily in a country 
with a lower degree of institutionalization also expands extant research on how institutional 
voids can create opportunities for entrepreneurial firms to grow without facing strong 
resistance (Khanna et al., 2005; Puffer et al., 2005; Mair & Marti, 2009; Gurses & Ozcan, 
2015). We show that leveraging technology to connect communities and address critical 
societal issues, such as security, helps entrepreneurs frame their products and services in the 
public interest and as complementary to extant institutions that they can then turn into 
favorable institutional conditions for growth.  
Similarly, the comparison between the Netherlands and the UK draws connections to 
the international business literature, e.g., the “glocalization” tensions associated with 
competition across borders (Robertson, 1995). We find that the extent to which acting locally 
and addressing the needs of the community leads to legitimation and market penetration 
largely depends on whether the national government leaves the regulation of a new service or 
product to local authorities or takes an active centralized role in establishing standards nation-
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wide. Interestingly, however, our findings also show that the government’s approach may not 
be entirely independent of the firms’ strategies. Our example of how early SE entrepreneurs 
played a critical role in influencing the UK government to take an active role in “enabling the 
SE,” which led to the government’s commissioning and actively working with the SEUK 
trade association in making decisions about the SE hints at this coevolutionary relationship.  
A second set of contributions from our study regarding the coevolution of firm 
strategy and the institutional environment is that while most studies in category creation and 
evolution consider categories as exogenous rules (Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Zuckerman, 1999; 
Durand & Paolella, 2013), we take the view of legitimization as an endogenous process 
whereby governments and municipalities categorize them within existing or new rules and 
laws by examining the interactions among consumers, firms, and the relevant institutions 
(Ozcan & Gurses, 2017). We emphasize how different stakeholders’ perceptions about Uber 
and Airbnb were formed as a result of the negotiations and interactions between key 
stakeholders, such as consumers, incumbent firms, local and central governments. Extant 
research shows that stakeholders’ perceptions play a crucial role in firms’ categorization 
(Gray, Purdy, & Ansari, 2015, Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Kennedy & Fiss, 2013), and, 
consequently, performance and governance (Rindova, Dalpiaz, & Ravasi, 2011), as well as 
the construction of rivalry among them (Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995), and 
the emergence of the market overall (Pólos, Hannan, & Carroll, 2002; Garud, Kumaraswamy, 
& Karnoe, 2010). Through a comparison of focal firm strategies and interactions with various 
stakeholders in three different countries, we show how the coevolutionary process between 
firms’ institutional and market entry strategies and the initial as well as subsequent reactions 
of various stakeholders in the institutional environment leads to the eventual legitimation 
versus rejection of SE firms. 
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Overall, by describing how similar institutional strategies may have different effects in 
different country contexts, we hope to motivate a future contingency theory of country 
institutional environments and firm institutional strategies. 
Understanding the SE as a Phenomenon 
In addition to the theoretical contributions discussed above, in which we treated the SE as an 
ideal setting to study the entry and growth of new firms in different institutional contexts, we 
believe that studying the SE itself offers important implications for management theorists and 
practitioners. First, the rise of the SE forces us to challenge the classical roles played by firms 
in a competitive landscape—e.g., suppliers, buyers, substitutes a la Porter (1980)—and even 
the definition of a firm (Moore, 2013). This new environment where a larger set of individuals 
and organizations create and exchange products and services without clear roles and borders, 
makes our findings about stakeholder thinking particularly important both for established 
firms that are under pressure to adapt as well as start-ups that aim to survive in the SE. 
 Anecdotally, we observe SE firms attempting to solve societal problems in other 
emerging country contexts as well. For example, Uber tackles safety issues in Mexico by 
offering a “share my trip” option whereby riders can let friends and family know their 
whereabouts and trip status. Similarly, Uber approached the Philippine government to form a 
partnership to offer its traffic technology solutions (e.g., data from thousands of trips both 
months before and after infrastructure projects open) to help determine the traffic impact of 
massive land infrastructure projects, such as roads and bridges.
22
 Expanding our findings 
beyond Egypt to understand the larger impact of this new phenomenon in solving societal 
problems will help generalize our findings further. 
                                                 
22
 This move came right after Uber had been banned (for a month) and paid nearly $10 million in penalties. The 
firm experienced even more severe problems when it confirmed on November 2016 that the names, email 
addresses and phone numbers of 57 million riders and drivers, including Filipino users, were stolen in a 
previously undisclosed data breach. 
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To conclude, this cross-sector, cross-country study of the SE aimed to provide a multi-
faceted account that includes the perspectives and actions of the different stakeholders in the 
SE as co-evolving within a large and constantly moving picture. It is our hope that future 
studies can build on these findings to expand our theoretical knowledge of the coevolution 
between firm strategy and the institutional environment and, in particular, the contingency 
effect of national and local stakeholders’ actions. These findings will also advance the 
dialogue among SE firms and various other stakeholders, such as lawmakers, to provide 
benefits to all.  
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FIGURE 1 
Overview of Key Stakeholders in the Sharing Economy 
SE firms  
(e.g., Uber, Airbnb, 
BlaBlaCar, 
Couchsurfing) 
Borrowers  
&  
Consumers 
Traditional 
incumbents doing 
similar transactions  
(e.g., taxis, hotels) 
Institutions 
(Governments, 
municipalities, banks, 
insurance companies, 
etc.) 
Lenders 
(owners/ providers 
of excess capacity) 
Community  
(e.g., organizations, 
cities) 
Transaction 
infrastructure 
(e.g., mobile 
intermediaries and 
electronic services) 
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Example 1
st
 order codes            2
nd
 order themes          Aggregate dimensions 
 
 
 
  
 Creating cash payment options Firm localizing strategies 
 Investing in GPS system Building infrastructure 
 Marketing campaigns 
 Setting lower prices 
Marketing / PR by SE 
firms 
Firm market 
strategies 
 Lobbying activities  
 Negotiations with regulatory 
institutions 
 Public campaigns  
 Hiring politically connected 
employees 
 
Political strategies by 
SE firms 
 Free taxi rides 
 Disaster response program  
Firms taking symbolic 
actions  
 Partnerships with NGOs 
 Educating lenders, drivers, or users 
 Certification 
 Governing action on platform 
 
Self-regulation by firms 
Firm non-
market 
strategies 
 Protest by taxi drivers/companies 
 Handing over Uber drivers to police 
  
Resistance by incumbent 
firms 
 
 Trade union lobbies against SE firms 
 Trade union contacts media  
 Lawsuit initiated by trade union 
Collective action by 
industry stakeholders 
 
 Complaints by residents 
 Local SE firms covered in media 
  
Reaction by other 
stakeholders 
 
Reactions to 
institutional 
strategies by 
SE 
stakeholders  
 New legislation local level 
 New legislation national level 
 Ban  
 
 
Regulation (government 
interventions) 
 
 Increase in Uber rides 
 Growth Airbnb 
  
Firm performance  
 
Outcomes for 
SE firms 
Firm institutional 
strategies 
FIGURE 2 
Overview code aggregation 
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FIGURE 3 
Uber’s car stickers in Egypt 
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TABLE 1 
Institutional Conditions in Each Country 
 The Netherlands The United 
Kingdom 
Egypt 
Overall level of 
institutionalization 
Higher Higher Lower 
Socio-economic 
characteristics 
Higher levels of 
interpersonal trust 
(World Value 
Survey, 2014), 
safety, digital literacy 
and awareness of SE. 
Higher levels of 
interpersonal trust 
(World Value Survey, 
2014), safety, digital 
literacy and 
awareness of SE. 
Lower levels of 
interpersonal trust 
(World Value Survey, 
2014), safety 
(Abdelhafez, 2015), 
digital literacy and 
awareness of SE.  
Infrastructural 
conditions 
Well-developed 
commercial, 
technological, and 
financial 
infrastructures. 
Well-developed 
commercial, 
technological, and 
financial 
infrastructures.  
Less-developed 
commercial, 
technological, and 
financial infrastructures 
but high mobile 
penetration rate and large 
number of smartphone 
users (Ministry of 
Communication and 
Information Technology, 
2015) 
Trade association Informal networks 
and knowledge 
institution 
(ShareNL). No trade 
association. 
Well-established 
trade association 
(SEUK).  
No formal networks or 
trade associations, 
largely informal contacts 
between firms and other 
SE stakeholders. 
Initial government 
stance towards SE 
Reactive and case-
by-case approach  
Proactive and 
supporting 
Reactive and no 
formalized policy 
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TABLE 2 
Overview Interviews and Secondary Data Sources 
 The Netherlands The United Kingdom Egypt 
Global SE 
platforms 
Platform Name and position Platform Name and position Platform Name and position 
Airbnb Chief Economist Airbnb 
 
  
Regional Manager 
Public Relations Officer 
Regional Manager 
Airbnb From secondary interviews 
obtained from archival 
sources 
Uber Operations Manager  
Technical lead - EMEA 
Uber Secondary interviews from 
archival sources 
Uber General manager 
Secondary data Secondary data Secondary data 
Newspapers articles; digital articles  Newspapers articles; digital articles  Newspapers articles; digital articles  
 
Local SE 
platforms 
Platform Name and position Platform Name and position Platform Name and position 
De Deelkelder Founder Lovehomeswap Founder and CEO Rakna General manager 
FLOOW2 
Meetingplaza 
HomeExchange 
Seats2Meet 
Peerby 
Business development lead  
Location Manager 
Country Representative 
Location Manager (3) 
Founder 
Bla Bla Car 
Easycar 
Under the Doormat 
Regional Manager 
CEO 
Founder and CEO 
Careem General manager 
      
Regulatory 
institutions 
Institution Name and position Institution Name and position Institution Name and position 
Ministry of economic 
affairs 
SE policy officer SEUK Founder and President, Chief 
Operations Officer 
Government Member of parliament 
Municipality of Amsterdam SE policy advisor     
Secondary data Secondary data Secondary data 
Newspaper articles, digital articles, government documents; 
research report.  
Newspaper articles, digital articles, government 
documents; research report. 
Newspaper articles, digital articles, report American 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Other SE 
stakeholders 
Actor Name and position Actor Name and position Actor Name and position 
Share NL 
Dutch association for SE 
platforms 
Forget the box (SE 
consultancy) 
Royal Dutch Hospitality 
association  
Royal Dutch Transportation 
association  
Taxi company (TCA) 
Co-founder UK Share 
British Hospitality 
Association 
London Cab 
Drivers Club 
 
President and Founder  
Member of the board 
 
Chairman 
Taxi drivers 
NHS Tourism 
 
Golden Travel 
Hamdullah Properties 
Uber drivers 
Former CEO 
Marketing Executive 
Airbnb host 
Airbnb host 
 
Founder 
 
Founder 
 
Member of the board 
 
Member of the board 
 
General manager 
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TABLE 3 
Overview costs and benefits for Airbnb’s stakeholders 
 
Stakeholder  
Cost and benefits 
Airbnb small scale (t = 0) 
Cost and benefits 
Airbnb large scale (t = 1) 
Airbnb Benefits (+) Major benefits (+++) (more 
apartments being rented out via 
Airbnb) 
Community (citizens 
of Amsterdam) 
No major costs or benefits (0) Major costs (--) (more problems 
with tourists/renters, increased 
house prices)  
Government 
institutions 
(municipality of 
Amsterdam) 
Some costs (maintaining fire 
regulations) and benefits 
(additional tourists) (0) 
Major costs (--) (protests by 
citizens, illegal hotels, taxation 
problems, problems with maintain 
fire regulations) 
Lenders (property 
owners) 
Benefits (+) Benefits (+) 
Traditional 
incumbents (e.g., 
hotels, restaurants, 
and trade 
associations) 
Some costs for incumbent 
hotels, benefits for other 
hospitality businesses (-/0) 
Some costs for incumbent hotels, 
benefits for other hospitality 
businesses (-/0) 
Consumers (tourists 
using Airbnb) 
Benefits (+) Benefits (+) 
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TABLE 4 
Effectiveness of SE Firm Strategies in Different Institutional Contexts 
 
 Higher degree of 
institutionalization   
(Institutions are able to facilitate 
market transactions, but are 
more difficult to transform) 
Lower degree of 
institutionalization   
(Institutions are less able to 
facilitate market transactions, 
but easier to transform) 
Additive strategies 
(Institutional costs 
lower for the SE 
firm; unchanged for 
others, i.e. win-no 
effect) 
A) Institutional environment is 
able to adequately facilitate 
market transactions, however 
higher resistance to change only 
allows for collaborative and 
“additive strategies”. 
(e.g. Airbnb in the UK and the 
Netherlands) 
B) Institutional environment is 
not able to adequately facilitate 
market transactions, it is 
difficult to implement 
collaborative and “additive 
strategies,”  
(e.g. Airbnb in Egypt) 
unless these strategies create 
similar levels of legitimacy as 
alternative options (e.g., taxis, 
hotels) in the country. 
(e.g. Uber in Egypt) 
Transformative 
strategies 
(Institutional costs 
lower for the SE 
firm; higher for 
others, i.e. win-lose) 
C) Institutional environment is 
able to adequately facilitate 
market transactions, however 
higher resistance to change 
makes it difficult to implement 
disruptive and “transformative” 
strategies.  
(e.g. Uber in the UK and the 
Netherlands) 
D) Institutional environment is 
not able to adequately facilitate 
market transactions, giving SE 
firms opportunities to address 
grand societal challenges and 
leverage the power they gain to 
implement disruptive and 
“transformative” strategies. 
(e.g. Uber in Egypt) 
